Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law
Other Law School Publications

Archives

5-1-1981

The Fine Print, Vol. 1, No. 2
Students of the University of Georgia School of Law

Repository Citation
Students of the University of Georgia School of Law, "The Fine Print, Vol. 1, No. 2" (1981). Other Law
School Publications. 303.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/lectures_pre_arch_archives_other/303

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archives at Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Other Law School Publications by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

LAW
Vol. 1 No. 2

May 1, 1981

DAY

Published by students of the University of Georgia School of Law

COMPACT COMMENTARIES
ON LEGAL TRENDS AND
DEVELOPMENTS

METHODS O F CONFLICT
RESOLUTION:

-

Louis B. Sohn The Role of Conciliation in International Disputes
Donald T. MacNaughton - The
Common Sense Approach t o Civil
Litigation
Robert Coulson - Arbitration-An
Alternative t o Litigation

A L S O FEATURING':
Frank Kennedy: Exemptions under
the Bankruptcy Reform Act
Heinrich von Moltke: Legal Obstacles t o Trade between the
United States and the European
Communitities
William F. Young: Prospero as Client: What d o Lawyen Owe t o
Businessmen?

PLUS:
ABA Comment on the Theme of
Law Day 1981

"Law-The Language of
Libertyn

2 The Fine Print

"LAW-THE LANGUAGE OF LIBERTY"
ABA Comment on the Theme of Law Day 1981
Clarence Earl Gideon sat in a Florida prison for
years, pleading his innocence and asserting his right to
the legal counsel which had been denied him. Gideon's
successful petition t o the United States Supreme
Court won a retrial and freedom for him and expanded the legal rights of all of us. The dramatic story of
how one poor and uneducated man proved once again
that ours is a government of laws, not men, was told
in book form and on network television in Gideon's
Trumpet.
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Contrast the freely disseminated Gideon's Trumpet
with another best-seller, The Gulag Archipelago, the
story of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's many tormented
years in the Russian penal system. This book had to
be smuggled out piecemeal for publication in the Free
World. For Solzhenitsyn, there was no appeal to law,
but only t o men who had the unrestricted power to
free him or not, at their own whim.
For Gideon, law was the language of liberty.
For Solzhenitsyn, law was the language of tyranny.
As there was with Gideon, there is injustice in the
American justice system. But our system has built into it a variety of self-correcting mechanisms so that
the errors of the last generation will not be visited
upon the next.
For well over a billion people on planet Earth, the
only correcting mechanism for injustice in their systems is revolution or flight. The judicial systems of
too many nations simply do not permit peaceful correction since they are systems fundamentally of men,
not law, and the men must be changed before progress can be made.
To remind Americans that our law is the basis of
individual rights, the ABA Standing Committee on
Association Communications has chosen "Law-the
Language of Liberty" for the 1981 Law Day theme.
Our joint efforts are intended to restate the fact that
the peaceful transfer of governmental power, the right
t o be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the right
to freedom of speech and worship . . . all these and
more are guaranteed us by law. And that these familiar phrases are our metaphors for liberty.
But liberty is a dynamic, not a static, concept. It
has been developing, growing and expanding for more
than seven and one-half centuries-since 1215, when
English nobles first won a measure of liberty and
equality by forcing King John t o sign the Magna Carta.
By July 4, 1776, the idea of liberty had so developed that the 13 United States could proudly declare:
"We hold these truths t o be self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights,
that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.-That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed . . ."
This development has not ceased. Our concept of
liberty under law has continued to grow, t o expand,
and to reach out and gather more and more people
within i t s protective shield.
continued on page 3

The Fine Prinr 3

Without freedom of speech, freedom of assembly,
freedom of religion, freedom of the press, equal protection of the laws, and other inalienable rights, men
could not govern themselves intelligently.
Liberty is hard to acquire or retain, but easy to lose.
It certainly is not free. Our liberty was won for us by
the untiring efforts of men and women past numbering.
As the preamble to our Constitution states, the
most solemn obligation resting upon us is to preserve
freedom for ourselves and our children and our children's children.
The central message of Law Day '81 is that a just
and democratic rule of law must prevail in order that
we may live together in peace and as a civilized society. In the final sense, we ourselves create the rule of
law through our legislative representatives, our courts,
and our daily conduct. . . .

in a 200-mile exclusive economic zone, and to boundaries of that zone and the continental shelf between
States with adjacent or opposite coasts), the so-called
"compulsory conciliation" was accepted in 1980 as a
compromise solution. Such conciliation can be invoked
unilaterally by any party to the dispute, and the other party is obliged to submit to that procedure; but,
as in other conciliation proceedings, the report of the
conciliation commission is recommendatory only and
does not bind the parties.

"Conciliation is less formal, less
time-consuming and less costly than
judicial or arbitral proceedings."

This comment on Law Day is reprinted from the 1981Planning
Guide and Program Manual of the American Bar Association.

THE ROLE OF CONCILIATION IN
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES
Professor Louis B. Sohn
Most American lawyers are trained to win cases for
their clients in adversary proceedings before courts,
administrative agencies, or arbitration panels. Only in
recent years has a new emphasis been put on settling
a dispute a t an early stage by more amicable means,
especially through negotiation or mediation.
In other countries, in particular in many developing countries, there is great interest in another method of dealing with disputes, i.e. conciliation, a process
relying on a third party but less rigid than court or arbitration proceedings. Similarly in international relations, there have been from time to time attempts to
promote conciliation as the most feasible means for
settling international disputes. For instance, the United
States concluded between 1928 and 1940 twentyseven conciliation agreements, mainly with European
countries, but also with Egypt and Ethiopia. The
United States is also a party, together with seventeen
Latin American countries, to the General Convention
of Inter-American Conciliation of 1929.
More recently, there has been a revival of the idea
of conciliation in two quite separate areas. During the
current negotiations on the law of the sea, an agreement was reached to submit some 90% of the disputes
which might arise under the new convention to an international court or an international arbitral tribunal.
But when difficulties arose with respect to certain disputes (those relating to fishing or scientific research

Also in 1980, the General Assembly of the United
Nations unanimously approved a set of Conciliation
Rules prepared by the United Nations Commission on
lnternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a body which
has been quite successful in reaching consensus on
practical trade issues between capitalist and "socialist"
States as well as between developed and developing
countries. It was pointed out in the General Assembly's discussion that many countries have found conciliation an effective method in a variety of international commercial disputes. By this procedure, the
parties can reach an amicable settlement with the assistance of a third party; it is non-judicial, does not
involve adversary proceedings, and allows the concil iator to assist the parties in an independent impartial
manner. Conciliation is less formal, less time-consuming and less costly than judicial or arbitral proceedings. The new rules emphasize the parties' freedom of
action a t all stages of the proceedings, and also give
the conciliator reasonably wide discretion in adapting
the process to the particular circumstances. He is likely to be guided by "principles of objectivity, fairness
and justice", giving consideration also to the usages of
the trade concerned. Like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules which were adopted in 1976 and have already achieved wide acceptance, the final text of the
Conciliation Rules represents compromise solutions
and has proved equally acceptable to countries with
different legal, social and economic systems.
It may also be noted that the lnternational Center
for Settlement of l nvestment Disputes, which i s associated with the lnternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development, has facilities not only for arbitration but also for conciliation.
Consequently, lawyers whose clients are interested
conrinued on page 4
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in international trade, investment or the exploitation
of the resources of the sea, should keep in mind that
in many parts of the world conciliation is the preferred
method of settling disputes, and that there are now
agreed rules on the subject. Another device has thus
been added to the lawyer's arsenal.
Louis B. Sohn is Bemis Professor of lnternational Law of Harvard Law School.

THE COMMON SENSE APPROACH TO
ClVl L LITIGATION
Donald T. MacNaughton, Esq.
In this era of burgeoning civil litigation the legal
profession is under constant criticism for what appears
to many to be a deterioration in the ability of our legal system quickly and efficiently to resolve disputes
among the members of our society. Practicing lawyers
often are confronted by neighbors and friends who
are unhappy about what they perceive t o be the current course of our system and who refer to protracted
court proceedings, which have generated mounds of
paper, the high cost of legal services and the plethora
of what they deem to be frivolous lawsuits. I have
heard criticisms of the contingent fee, as an alleged
inducement to wasteful and unjustifiable court proceedings, and also recently have read an attack upon
the practice of hourly time charges for the very same
reasons.
There is no doubt that we are experiencing what
Mr. Justice Powell called in an address entitled "Reforms-Long Overdue", given to The Association of
The Bar of the City of New York in October, 1978,
an "epidemic of litigation" which has contributed to
an "overload crisis" in our courts. He cited other contributing causes in the rules of civil procedure and the
liberality and multiplicity of review.

by those outside the profession who are so quick to
criticize it. Some of the fruits of the reform effort include the recent 1980 amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, including the addition of
Rule 26(f), providing for a discovery conference.
Other proposals, including a change in Rule 26(b)(l)
with respect to the scope of discovery and a change in
Rule 33(a) to limit the number of questions that can
be asked by interrogatories to parties, were considered a t length although not ultimately adopted by the
Committee on Rules of Practice of Procedure. As to
these proposals the Committee concluded that discovery abuses can best be prevented by negotiation by
counsel and by resort to court intervention if counsel
are not successful in effecting a reasonable discovery
program.
As a practicing trial lawyer, I have become a firm
believer in a common sense approach to civil litigation. That extra bit of discovery, that extra pre-trial
motion or trip to interview yet another potential witness should not be undertaken without a careful evaluation of i t s necessity, i t s potential cost, i t s potential
for success and the overall benefit such a step offers
to the case, particularly in the context of the sums a t
stake. More often than not, the fact that the rules
may authorize such a step does not mean that counsel
is obligated to undertake it. This type of evaluation
often is difficult to perform, for it seems intrinsically
to conflict both with the advocate's natural inclination to be as aggressive as possible in our adversarial
system of justice and with the attorney's training and
discipline to be careful, precise and thorough. Yet, an
unnecessary and unsuccessful motion, undertaken a t
substantial cost to the client by an overzealous advocate, is a disservice to the client, t o the court and to
the public.
Donald T. MacNaughton is a partner of White & Case in New
York City.

"It is not surprising that public dissatisfaction is high,
and criticism of lawyers and the courts is now a popular
pastime. Although this assessment of blame is often unfair, it is clear that the public rightly expects lawyers and
judges to take the lead in achieving reform."

ARBITRATION-AN ALTERNATIVE
TO LITIGATION

The reform effort has been substantial overthe past
few years. The profession certainly has not failed to
respond to the call. Thousands of hours of attorney's
time have been devoted, individually and in various
bar association activities, to efforts to identify the
problems and to develop methods of improving the
judicial system. This job has gone on largely unnoticed

At many law schools, arbitration does not exist as
a subject. For that matter, negotiating skills are seldom included in the formal curriculum. At the most,
a lecture or two on labor law will describe the union
grievance arbitration process. International arbitration may be mentioned in a casual way.

Robert Coulson, Esq.

continued on page 5
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Only after graduation do law students learn that
the primary function of most lawyers is to negotiate
contracts and hammer out settlements. To their surprise, they discover arbitration clauses in contract after contract. They wonder why no one ever told them
about the Uniform Arbitration Law, the various rules
of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and
the intriguing notion that their clients would prefer
not to resolve business controversies in court. Clients
rarely appreciate an attorney who leads them into litigation. Most Americans do not believe that a courthouse provides a realistic, practical method for resolving business disputes. Court procedures are seen as
anachronistic.

negotiation. Local AAA offices provide literature, information and an opportunity to audit arbitration
hearings. Seminars are also available. Lawyers and law
students are welcome to take advantage of these resources. Such exposure will reveal a major segment of
the American legal process that has been obscured by
the court-oriented law school curriculum.
Robert Coulson, a member of the Bar of the City of New York,
is President of the American Arbitration Association.

EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

"Businessmen prefer to present their controversies to an impartial expert . . . They
appreciate the informality, the privacy and
the convenience of arbitration."

Arbitration has become an attractive alternative to
litigation. Businessmen prefer to present their controversies to an impartial expert, someone who understands their trade. They appreciate the informality,
the privacy and the convenience of arbitration. In
general, they prefer a system that results in a final
and binding decision. The AAA, a private nonprofit
agency, administers over 40,000 arbitration cases each
year. More than 60,000 arbitrators serve on the AAA's
panels, including lawyers, engineers, executives and
other experts. There are many other arbitration systems in operation involving insurance, securities, maritime claims and other specialized areas. Lawyers are
involved in all of them.
Of course, businessmen would rather avoid arbitration. In most cases, being practical people, they would
prefer to settle disputes without resort to a third party. Arbitration clauses aid such settlement by encouraging the parties to make concessions among themselves in order to avoid third party intervention. Any
issue that can be arbitrated can be settled but if the
parties cannot settle, their disputes can always be
arbitrated.
Law students should acquire basic negotiating skills
during their legal education. Nothing learned a t law
school will be more helpful after graduation. The ability to bargain for clients, use arbitration clauses in
contracts and present cases in the various arbitration
forums will strengthen an attorney's ability to resolve
problems.
The American Arbitration Association can assist
lawyers and law students wishing to learn more about

Professor Frank Kennedy
Senate hearings conducted early in April 1981 focused in considerable part on provisions for exemptions under the bankruptcy laws. Changes in those
provisions made by and following in the wake of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 suggest the appropriateness of some comments on their effects and
implications.
Bankruptcy in the United States has departed
profoundly from the institution as it appeared in i t s
earliest forms in continental Europe and England
and as it has subsequently developed in those countries. The major difference is the recognition in the
American law that providing a fresh start for a debtladen individual i s a principal and proper goal of
bankruptcy. Congress pursued that goal by extending, in successive bankruptcy acts and amendments,
the benefits available to bankrupts, particularly in
provisions allowing debtors to keep property exempt from their creditors' claims and discharging
their debts. It has frequently been contended by
opponents of this kind of legislation that it will hurt
rather than help the intended beneficiaries because it
will lead to a restriction on the availability of consumer credit. Comparison of the figures showing the
volume of consumer credit in this and other countries
quickly dispels the notion that our debtor-oriented
bankruptcy laws have had a constrictive effect on the
availability of credit.
Congress is granted the power to establish "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States" by Article 1, section 8, of
the Constitution. The mandate of uniformity has
not been deemed to require Congress to enact a
comprehensive code of substantive law of property
and creditors' rights and debtors' obligations for application in bankruptcy cases. Rather the bankruptcy
continued on page 6
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laws, like the federal tax laws, have been superimposed on the body of substantive law of the several
states. Thus, when Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, it allowed every bankrupt t o have
the benefit of the laws of the state of his or her
domicile exempting property from claims of creditors. This provision was promptly challenged as unconstitutional because of the resulting nonuniformity of the exemptions available t o bankrupts domiciled in different states. The Supreme Court rejected
the challenge by finding "geographic uniformity."

". . . the federal and state legislation that
allows domiciliaries of some states to have
the benefit of federal exemptions and
denies the option to domiciliaries of other states is both unwise and unconstitutional."
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States nevertheless recommended in 1973
that the exemptions allowable t o a bankrupt be prescribed by a uniform national standard. As the
Commission explained, "This approach avoids the
unfairness of existing state exemptions laws, most
of which are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as
t o urban residents." The Commission's proposal
met strong resistance, however, particularly from
states that had more generous exemption laws than
those proposed by the Commission. As an eloquent
Dallas lawyer said, "Texas came into the union with
i t s homestead and it will go out with i t s homestead i f
federal legislation attempts t o take it away." H.R.
8200, passed by the House on February 1,1978, would
have allowed a bankrupt individual t o choose between
a federal package of exemptions and those provided
by the laws of his or her state of domicile. S. 2266,
which passed the Senate on September 6, 1978, however, would have restricted exemptions to those allowable under the law of the bankrupt's state of domicile.
This discrepancy was one among several hundred differences between the two comprehensive bankruptcy
bills passed by the two houses of Congress that had t o
be reconciled in the closing days of the 95th Congress. The compromise that emerged was one that
allows an individual debtor to choose between federal and state exemptions as provided in the House
Bill, unless the debtor's state, by subsequent1y enacted legislation, withdraws the right to opt for federal exemptions. I t is regrettable that 18 state legislatures (according t o the latest report to reach me)

have acted t o deprive their constituents of the option that Congress has extended t o debtors living in
other states.
In my opinion the federal and state legislation
that allows domiciliaries of some states to have the
benefit of federal exemptions and denies the option
to domiciliaries of other states is both unwise and
unconstitutional. It will hardly be contended that
Congress could enact as a part of a national bankruptcy act a provision allowing any state legislature
t o deprive i t s domiciliaries of the right t o seek relief generally available under the act t o persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. I t would
be no less offensive as a matter of constitutional
principle for Congress t o authorize a state to deprive
i t s domiciliaries of the right to obtain a discharge or
t o claim exemptions generally available t o debtors
domiciled in other states. Challenges t o legislation on
the ground that it constitutes an unconstitutional
delegation are not favored, but there are limitations
on the extent t o which Congress can delegate i t s
power respecting bankruptcy t o state legislatures. It
can no doubt, as it did during most of the Nineteenth
Century, leave bankruptcy entirely t o the states,
subject to-the constitutional limitations of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Congress also can, as it did
in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, enact bankruptcy
legislation that leaves most state substantive law
undisturbed notwithstanding i t s diversity. It flouts
the constitutional mandate of uniformity, however,
for Congress t o include in a bankruptcy law a proviso
authorizing a state legislature t o withdraw benefits of
the federal law solely on the basis of the location of
the debtor's domicile.
Both federal and state laws are subject to constitutional challenge when they deny equal protection. The federal and state legislation that allows
the availability of the federal exemptions t o depend
on the location of the debtor's domicile seems vulnerable t o a charge of irrational and thus indefensible classification, but the courts have indulged an
almost conclusive presumption of constitutionality
on classifications that are not predicted on race. In
like manner, state legislation that deprives domiciliaries of particular states of the right to choose federal exemptions seems to be a plain abridgment of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States in derogation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but that guaranty has been given exceedingly narrow scope by the Supreme Court.
Congress may respond to some of the current criticism of the exemption provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act by placing some limitations on the
exemptions allowable in bankruptcy, irrespective
continued on page 7
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of whether the debtor claims state or federal exemptions. It is my hope, however, that Congress
will terminate what I believe to be an ill advised
and unconstitutional delegation to state legislatures
of the power to determine whether federal rights
to relief under the Bankruptcy Act should be available to their domiciliaries.
Frank R. Kennedy is Thomas M. Cooley Professor of the
University of Michigan Law School.

LEGAL OBSTACLES TO TRADE BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES

by imports, or unless the petitioner withdraws his
complaint. Procedures can be extremely long and costly. One example is the antidumping procedureopened
in 1980 by the U.S. Steel Corporation against imports
of steel from seven E.C. Member States. Not only did
legal fees for the defendants run into very important
figures, but, more importantly, the very opening of
the investigation had a chilling effect on trade. Steel
is a commodity where delivery (for a trans-atlantic
producer) would normally occur about three months
after the conclusion of a contract. Since the Commerce Department was due to make i t s preliminary
determination of the existence of dumping in October 1980, following which antidumping duties could
be imposed, new orders started dwindling in June,
with consequent substantial losses for E.C. producers.

Heinrich von Moltke
One of the major achievements of the Multilateral
Trade Negotiations concluded in 1979 was the adoption by most industrialized countries (and certain developing ones) of a number of revisions to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). These revisions covered, inter alia, uniform rules in respect of
the application of anti-dumping and countervailing
duties. The United States and the European Communities (E.C.), which are the world's major traders, subsequently adopted rather similar domestic legislation
implementing these new rules.
However, while the transcription of the GATT rules
into domestic legislation is similar on both sides of
the Atlantic, the differences in legal systems and administrative traditions may lead to rather different
consequences for trade. In the E.C. these rules are administered entirely by the Commission of the European Communities, whose decisions may be challenged
before the Court of Justice of the European Communities. In the United States, the Commerce Department is responsible for the administration, but the International Trade Commission has a decisive role to
play in that it determines whether imports cause "material injury". In the absence of such a determination,
a case cannot be pursued. Commerce Department decisions can, of course, be challenged in court.
The main difference between the two systems, and
the one which creates most concern for European exporters, is the great detail and inflexibility of U.S. regulations in the field of dumping and subsidy investigations. Once an investigation has been started, it is virtually impossible for the U.S. administration to stop
the procedure, unless the International Trade Commission finds that there is no material injury caused

". . . while

the transcription of the G A l T rules
into domestic legislation is similar on both
sides of the Atlantic, the differences in legal
systems and administrative traditions may
lead to rather different consequences for
trade."

While the particular characteristics of the steel industry (i.e., the long lead time referred to above) exascerbated the effects of the antidumping investigation, similar "chilling" effects can be expected for other
branches of industry. In these branches, as in the steel
industry, the uncertainty engendered by the opening
of an investigation will be compounded by the difficulty in calculating dumping margins. Ultimately,
there will be a chilling effect on trans-atlantic trade.
Heinrich von Moltke is Deputy Head of the Delegation of the
Commission of the European Communitiesto the United States
in Washington, D. C.

PROSPER0 AS CLIENT: WHAT DO LAWYERS
OWE TO BUSINESSMEN?
Professor William F. Young
Some years ago when the world price of wheat
moved up sharply, a newspaper reader learned that
the United States government proposed to honor a
commitment to deliver a large quantity of wheat to
the U.S.S.R.-at far below the current market price.
continued on page 8
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The reader wrote a letter to the editor complaining of
the terms of the contract. His complaint was directed
to the competence of the lawyers for the United
States who had negotiated the terms of sale. He said,
in substance, that every competent lawyer writes
contracts with loopholes the size of barn doors, such
that a party can edge out when circumstances make
his commitment an uncomfortable one. Why, the
writer asked querulously, weren't the lawyers on our
side good enough to do that? Remembering that
letter has made me smile, from time to time, but it
has also prompted me to think what commercial interests-businessmen-are entitled to expect from lawyers. Not only regarding the fiduciary duties owed an
individual client by a lawyer but also what the business world is entitled to from the institutions and dispositions of the law. What kinds of support can business firms fairly claim from lawyers acting corporately, whether as practitioners, as judges, or as legislators?

"A lawyer must not undertake service that implies either magical means
for business ends or servile acceptance of business values."

My answer is, in general, "very little." Lawyers only owe to businessmen a full and attentive hearing,
profound sympathy with their grievances and objectives, a thorough grasp of means in relation to ends,
diligence, clarity in expression, the candor of a good
penitent, the skill and patience of a great teacher, and
a few other related items. Asking for all that, one
might say, is a t a l l order, particularly when a person
of any humility considers his own ability to deliver.
But nowhere in the list is there anything aboutresults.
I propose that we in the law do not owe a given effect,
or set of effects, to all and sundry business arrangements.
There are those-such as the letter writer-who say
otherwise. Some say we owe businessmen the widest
possible field in which to pursue self-interest. Some
say we owe them clear and certain statements about
the legal consequences of their acts. Some say we owe
them exemption from struggles of conscience about
the damage they may inflict on their fellows in business, and perhaps even about injury to the general welfare. And some make much more complicated de-

mands. An economist asks the courts to steer for that
single set of laws tending most to make our society
wealthy. A philosopher calls for an exact line between
deals that are allowed and deals that are not, based on
a legal accounting (as it were) of costs and benefits to
dealers and nondealers alike. In my judgment, lawyers
and the law had better not promise any of these things
and ought to withhold absolute allegiance to any ordering of commercial affairs.
Surely the compact between law and business requires, on our side, only a tentative and flexible commitment to what businessmen do and ask. It i s all too
easy for the law to be conscripted by the supposed requirements of commerce: courts have been known t o
treat usage of trade as a Higher Law that overrides a
plain-spoken contract. It is tempting for lawyers to
wink at overreaching in business. It is tempting also
for law and lawyers to infuse a spirit of confrontation
into business dealings, turning every negotiation and
grievance into a shoot-out. ~usinessmendeserve better than that. A t times we must reinforce their scruples at the expense of their greed, even when we do
not know what the ultimate social end may be. Sometimes, as Saint Paul said, one must "speak, and exhort,
and rebuke with all authority;" and so the law must
deal with business mores. A t times we must enlist on
the side of greed, counting a competitive gain as part
of the general gain. To quote again (out of context)
from Saint Paul: "every man hath his proper gift." A t
times we must insist on humanitarianism in the pursuit of profit, knowing that one who takes spoils from
another demeans both himself and the other. "Let
your moderation be known unto all men," said the
same author.
It is for lawyers and businessmen together, and together with those who are neither-citizens all-to say
what sorts of assistance business purposes may fairly
claim from law and lawyers. Lawyers are indispensable counsellors in this regard. But the grounds for justify ing both business purposes and legal supports for
them lie outside the law. If a businessman brings his
expectations to his lawyer for armor plating, he is asking too much; and i f he wants to live in a world of legal loopholes, he is also expecting too much. A lawyer must not undertake service that implies either
magical means for business ends or servile acceptance
of business values. To the client, Prospero, he must be
faithful withal, but he must not serve him either as
Ariel or as Caliban.

William F. Young is James L. Dohr Professor of Columbia
Oniversity School of Law.

